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THE REFERENCE OF "GOD" 
Richard B. Miller 
Analytically inclined philosphers of religion have commonly assumed that 1) '"God" must 
be defined before arguments for or against his existence can be evaluated 2) the history 
of religious beliefs is irrelevant to their justification. In this paper I apply the causal 
theory of reference to "God" and challenge both assumptions. If, as Freud supposes, 
"God" originates in the delusions of the mentally ill then it does not refer. On the other 
hand, if "God" originates in encounters with some Entity, no matter how vaguely con-
ceived, then That is God. 
This paper began several years ago with a simple idea. I had recently become 
convinced of the superiority of the views of Kripke, Donnellan and Putnam on 
reference to the descriptivist way in which it was traditionally conceived and I 
asked myself what significance this might have for the philosophy of religion. 
The standard analytic move of transforming the question "Does God exist?" into 
"Does 'God' refer? was an easy first step. From there I had only to apply the 
causal theory of reference to "God" and see what new insights developed. 
The results have surprised me. This simple experiment has radically altered 
my views on the philosophy of religion. Assumptions which I never questioned 
I have abandoned; authors and arguments I took to be naive and irrelevant I now 
read seriously. I offer this paper in the hope that others will find the experiment 
as stimulating as I have found it. Not everyone will, certainly. Those who do 
not share the assumptions under which I formerly operated will find the theory 
less challenging. Also, those who have not been convinced by the causal theory 
of reference (CTR) will not be persuaded. I hope that there will be some interest 
in what I am trying to do, however, since the CTR is now widely, though not 
universally, accepted and has not yet, to my knowledge, been applied to the 
philosophy of religion. 
A particularly clear example of the set of assumptions which CTR disturbs 
can be found in the Russell-Copleston BBC debate on the existence of God. 
Lord Russell and Father Copleston disagree about a great many things in that 
exchange, but it is on what they agree that I now wish to focus. I think that 
there are four mutually agreed assumptions which structure their dispute. I 1) 
Religion is philosophically interesting insofar as it consists of significant beliefs 
about reality. 2) The philosopher's job is to examine those beliefs in order to 
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determine whether or not they are rationally justified. 3) Existence claims are 
to be examined by moving them to the linguistic level. 4) Existence claims, now 
understood as reference claims, can be evaluated only after the meaning of key 
terms, viz., "God," have been fixed by definition. Philosophy is in general 
understood as define-your-terms-and-deduce-the-consequences, and philosophy 
of religion becomes in large measure the definition of "God" as the omnipotent, 
omniscient, omnibenevolent, Creator of the world and the critical examination 
of the traditional arguments for His existence. 
There have been other attempts to break out of the constraining set of assump-
tions which I describe above. Paul Tillich2 and John Wisdom' independently but 
in parallel have tried to find a different language for philosophy of religion by 
rejecting the first assumption that I mentioned. Tillich, taking his inspiration 
from Heidegger, and Wisdom, taking his inspiration from Wittgenstein,. were 
concerned to give an analysis of religion which denied that it included beliefs 
in the normal sense at all. Hence the rational justification of these beliefs via 
the traditional arguments could be set aside. This sort of "enlightened" position 
that defends religion from rational criticism by denying that it says anything 
seems to be enjoying less favor than it once did. It is not my intention to provide 
a similarly "enlightened" reanalysis of religious language and belief. I still accept 
assumptions 1-3. The rejection of 4)" is, as I will show, radical enough. 
"Define your terms." To many philosophers this seems to be an innocent 
request. The need for definitions of key terms is not considered controversial. 
It ought to be., It is necessary to pin down a term so that one can tell to what it 
refers, but the way to do this is not necessarily by defining it. 
The descriptivist theory of reference (DTR) hohls that words refer to objects 
via some sort of description. The "description" could be a set of ideas in the 
speaker's mind, or a set of his beliefs, or, for those skeptical of such entities as 
minds, a set of behaviorally defined crheria of identification. Reference is, in 
descriptivist terms, a matter of matching or corresponding to or being picked 
out by the relevant description. 
Reference can be either singular or general. A name or a description can refer 
singularly to individuals or generally to classes. "Egg-laying, hairy, warm-
blooded, duck-billed animal which nurses its young" refers to platypuses because 
while they are not the only egg-layers they are the only beasts which fit the 
complete description. DTR would further explain the ability of speakers to use 
"platypus" to refer to the same class by interpreting "platypus" as an abbreviation 
for the description just mentioned. 
DTR holds that in normal cases of singular reference if there is a referent it 
is that individual which uniquely fits the description. One can refer to Aristotle 
as "the student of Plato and the teacher of Alexander" or as "Aristotle." Names 
according to this theory are but disguised descriptions. Not all cases of singular 
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reference work out so well for DTR, and the theory must deal with hard cases 
as well. A description may be incomplete so that in fact many individuals fit 
the description though it is intended, and succeeds, in referring to one individual. 
"The student of Plato" can be used to refer to Aristotle though he was not the 
only such student. Worse yet, partially or even wholly false descriptions may 
refer. "The boy who chopped down his father's cherry tree and couldn't tell a 
lie" refers to Washington though false and many could not supply a true identifying 
description. 
Sophisticated descriptivists try to handle the problems of incomplete and inac-
curate descriptive phrases and of the inability of speakers to supply complete 
and accurate descriptive equivalents of names by making reference depend on 
implied open-ended sets of descriptions which may not be fully conscious to 
language users. When using a name or an incomplete or inaccurate descriptive 
phrase the speaker may be alleged to "have in mind" some description which is 
sufficient to pick out the intended referent and only the intended referent. In the 
case of our first President a speaker might, if challenged on the historical inac-
curacy of the cherry tree myth, claim to have meant "the President commonly 
purported to have chopped down his father's cherry tree." 
Descriptivists explain the function of referential expressions as implicit or 
explicit descriptions. The variations in the way DTR handles cases which do not 
readily fit such a pattern have necessarily been excluded from this brief account, 
but I hope the general outline of this common theory has been made sufficiently 
clear. 
The causal theory of reference (CTR) on the other hand holds that words refer 
to objects via their causal-historical connections with those objects. The necessary 
causal-historical connections are understood differently and some what vaguely 
by different proponents of CTR. The two early developers of the theory have 
recently disputed as to whether the theory should be expressed in semantic or 
in pragmatic terms. 6.Counter-attacks on CTR have come from descriptivists and 
a new rival to both CTR and DTR has appeared in the work of Colin McGinn. 7 
Into the details of this lively and current debate among philosophers of language 
I do not intend to allow myself to be drawn in this paper. Any attempt to defend 
CTR from its critics would distract me from the task at hand, viz., the application 
of CTR to the reference of "God." 
The theory as I will employ-it is largely Keith Donnellan's though, as indicated, 
an elaborate exposition or defense will not be attempted. This version of CTR 
states that there is one way, not the only way, in which words can be used to 
pick out things in which the causal-historical relations of referents and language-
users are paramount. The basic cases of reference are the direct references of a 
language user to some referent, typically physically present in his immediate 
environment. The conditions under which direct reference takes place seem 
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intUItIve, but it is difficult to state exactly what they are. (The problem will 
appear in another fom1 later in this exposition when I will have occasion to 
describe "blocks.") Both names and descriptions can be used to directly refer to 
objects, but examples using names in direct reference are perhaps clearer. Suppose 
an explorer untrained in biology discovers curious beaver-like creatures which 
he tags with the name "platypus." The name sticks and can be used to successfully 
refer to platypuses though the explorer may know very little about them and be 
far from able to supply a unique identifying description. Indeed, for a long time 
no one may be able to supply such a description. Infom1ally we all know how 
such tagging takes place and generally agree on what C:lses are and are not direct 
references even if we cannot describe necessary and sufficient conditions for 
this to take place. 
Donnellan has also pointed out how descriptive phrases can be used in the 
same way. Direct reference is not limited to those words which are grammatically 
names. A description may be used referentially (non-descriptively) as the name 
of something which does not fit the description. Donnellan gives interesting 
examples of this. A speaker can use some descriptive phrase referentially in a 
question ("Who is the man drinking the martini?" refers in fact to a man drinking 
mineral water out of a martini glass.); an assertion ("Smith's murderer is insane." 
can refer to the prisoner in the courtroom who is acting so oddly even if he is 
innocent.); or command ("Bring me the book on the table." can be a request for 
the book beside the table.) Instead of postulating implicit identifying descriptions 
which neither speakers nor listeners may be able to supply without prompting 
the CTR denies that any expressed or implied true description need be present 
in anyone's mind for reference to succeed. 8 
Direct references, clear in particular cases though vague in the abstract, make 
possible remote references. Chains of remote reference may be built up from 
the anchor of a direct reference. Defenders of CTR hold that "George Washington" 
can still be used referentially though, obviously, George Washington is no longer 
present. When I refer to him now the fact that I have referred to him and not 
to Thomas Paine is due to the causal-historical chain leading from some direct 
references to George, and not to Thomas, via a chain of uses of the name, written 
and oral, culminating in my own case. I have many true beliefs about George 
Washington, not to mention the false ones, and so did other language users in 
the chain, but these true beliefs are neither necessary nor sufficient to make my 
use of "George Washington" refer to the famous Virginia farmer. My four year 
old daughter, for example, was told the cherry tree fable by her nursery school 
teacher and this represents the sum total of her "knowledge" of George 
Washington. Despite this, she can refer to George Washington because her use 
is traceable to her teacher's which is part of a chain which originates in a fabled 
but not imaginary George Washington. 
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It is not always the case that a single direct reference anchors the chain. The 
original direct reference may not be traceable to a single individual. In normal 
cases remote references are grounded in multiple direct references which may 
even be widely separated in time. For example, remote references to Jerusalem 
are grounded in direct references to that city in the present and stretching back 
into antiquity. 
Neither direct nor remote references fail due to mistaken beliefs about the 
referent so long as appropriate causal-historical conditions hold. Reference fails 
according to CTR only when the investigation of the causal ancestry of the name 
of description's use leads to what Donnellan calls a "block." He defines a block 
as "events that preclude any referent's being identified."9 As far as I know no 
one has been able to supply necessary and sufficient conditions which would 
enable us to clearly distinguish histories which constitute blocks from those 
which do not but are merely defective or unusual in other ways. This weakness 
has not prevented the theory from making converts, myself among them, though 
I confess that I would feel more comfortable if the theory were more precise on 
this point. Donnellan is untroubled by the charge that the theory is vague at this 
crucial point and proceeds to clarify by examples. If a history ends in a fiction 
told as a reality, or an egregious misperception as in a trick of light being taken 
for a person or a scholar's assumption that a collection of fragments had a 
common author when it does not then these referential chains end in blocks. 
The point is that it is not merely that some speaker has made a serious mistake 
in identifying the referent but that he has used the name or description in a 
context in which there is no plausible candidate for referent. 
Donnellan formulates the following rule for negative existence statements. 
(R) If N is a proper name that has been used in predicative statements 
with the intention to refer to some individual, then 'N does not exist' 
is true if and only if the history of those uses ends in a block. 10 
As I will show this rule establishes the philosophical relevance of the history of 
religion to the existence of God. In the next section I will explain how the 
application of CTR to religious language has important consequences for the 
philosophy of religion. 
II 
A subject of such enduring interest as religion has naturally developed a long 
and complex tradition of philosophical reflection. The part of that tradition which 
had always seemed to me the most deserving of attention was that of natural 
theology, by which I mean the philosophical examination of arguments for and 
against traditional religious beliefs especially the existence of God. Key terms 
8 Faith and Philosophy 
were defined and arguments carefully expounded, criticized and restated. On 
the other hand there existed another vigorous strand of philosophical reflection 
on religion which I felt justified in ignoring. The work of Feuerbach, Marx, 
Nietzsche, and Freud represents a continuous tradition, which can be labeled 
"critique ," 1 1 that I felt could be dismissed as not really philosophical. These 
thinkers investigated or speculated about the origins of religion in general and 
of Christianity in particular. They took their work to be, and many intellectuals 
both within and outside of philosophy agreed, a convincing refutation of the 
rationality of religious belief. I took this claim to be naive and when one of my 
students echoed some version of critique I was dismissive. 
Such speculations, I held, could have psychological interest but they have no 
bearing on whether or not it is rational to believe that God exists. Hans Kung, 
a noted Catholic theologian who has devoted great attention to the tradition of 
critique, is similarly dismissive of the claim that critique has such relevance. 
It does not follow-as some theologians have mistakenly concluded-
from man's profound desire for God and eternal life, that God exists 
and eternal life and happiness are real. But some atheists, too, are 
mistaken in thinking that what follows is the nonexistence of God and 
the unreality of eternal life .... 
Here, then, again, as earlier with Feuerbach and Marx, we have 
reached the crux of the problem, which is not at all difficult to understand 
and in the face of which any kind of projection theory, opium theory 
or illusion theory momentarily loses its suggestive power. Perhaps this 
being of our longings and dreams does actually exist. ... 
It should be observed that Freud has not in fact destroyed or refuted 
religious ideas in principle, and neither atheists nor theologians should 
ever read this into his critique of religion. For, by its very nature, 
psychological interpretation alone cannot penetrate to the absolutely 
final or first reality: on this point it must remain neutral in principle. 12 
To accept this belief in the metaphysical neutrality of critique leads to some 
unfortunate consequences. On the one hand some will be inclined to accept the 
truth of these psychological or historical accounts too readily since they wrongly 
believe that their truth makes no difference. This may result in dubious claims 
slipping by unchallenged. On the other hand it can lead to a failure to make the 
claims inherent in the theory clear. A general laxness prevails when the particip-
ants do not know what questions to ask or are not convinced that anything of 
moment is at stake. 
CTR changes all this. Applying Donnellan's Rule R to "God" we have the 
following principle. 
(G) If "God" is a proper name that has been used in predicative statements 
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with the intention to refer to some individual then "God does not exist" 
is true if and only if the history of those uses ends in a block. 
9 
The antecedent is unquestionably true. Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche and Freud 
can all be interpreted as arguing that this history of uses of the proper name 
"God" ends in a block. Of course none had CTR in mind when he wrote but I 
think that without much reconstruction one can see each as claiming this. 
Depending on the version of critique in question the history leads us back to 
man's projection of his own nature on tht: world as a whole or to the jealousy 
and cowardice of the masses, or to the illusions of satisfaction concocted out of 
the frustration of human needs in oppress,ive economic conditions, or to unre-
solved Oedipal anxieties and/or infantile experiences of contentment. Although 
the notion of a block is not analyzed into necessary and sufficient conditions it 
seems plain that if all the referential chains of "God" 's uses terminated in the 
egregious misidentification of some internal state of the speaker then no referent 
has been identified. If a strong enough version of critique were true "God" would 
not refer. Pace Kung, critique is not metaphysically neutral. 
One obvious objection must surely be faced. 13 Is it not possible, though this 
admittedly goes against our expectations of how God would choose to reveal 
Himself, that God planned for the human race to formulate an idea of Him in, 
for example, the way Freud describes? In ,:reating the world according to Divine 
plan does not God become part of the causal history of "God" even if the 
immediate causes are just as critique hypothesizes. If all events are part of God's 
plan then natural causes such as Oedipal conflicts could be used as instruments 
of the Divinity to reveal Himself. Does not this possibility show that Freud's 
hypothesis is compatible with "God" referring and that no account of naturalistic 
causes of religious experience or belief constitutes a block? 
I answer by admitting that there could exist a Being with some or even all of 
the attributes commonly ascribed to God to have planned that humans should 
evolve, develop Oedipal feelings and resolve them in many instances by coming 
to believe in God, speaking of God and passing on this language and these 
beliefs to others. I deny that this possibility shows the metaphysical neutrality 
of critique. If there were a Being who matched our beliefs in God so fortuitously 
it would not be God. Donnellan is perfectly correct when he says that, in a 
parallel case, if parents made up the Santa Claus legend and told it to children 
as fact that constitutes a block even if there does happen to be a jolly old elf 
who delivers presents on Christmas Eve. this elf is not Santa. Indeed, there is 
no Santa Claus. 
But does the Divine Being's choice of Oedipal conflicts as the natural means 
of bringing about belief in Himself not constitute a crucial difference? Unlike 
the elf the Divine Being would playa part in the chain of causes leading up to 
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the word's use even though the role is very indirect. Not every causal relation 
between an object and a word's use will suffice to establish reference and it 
seems clear that in such a case reference could not be grounded in such a 
circuitous causal history. One must bear in mind that on the assumption of the 
creation of the world according to this being's plan it would bear exactly the 
same causal relation to "Santa Claus," "Paul Bunyon," "unicorn," and all other 
words without another claimant for the role of referent. Intuitions differ about 
whether Donnellan's elf is Santa or not but no one would want to maintain that 
this divine being was also a unicorn. God knew from creation and intended to 
bring about by natural means uses of all fictitious terms but He is not all fictitious 
beings. Likewise if a divine being were to bring about use of "God" in a way 
similar to the way mythical uses arise then I do not see why "God" would not 
also fail to refer. 
Another objection is that, as I have admitted, CTR is not the whole story on 
reference. It is more plausible to hold that it is only one, though the most common 
and important, mechanism of reference. The failure of "God" to refer in virtue 
of its causal-historical relations to God, if that is what critique establishes, does 
not show that "God" does not refer. If "God" were typically used attributively 
as an abbreviation for "whatever or whoever is the omnipotent, omniscient 
Creator etc." then my conclusions would have to be revised. I will admit that 
"God" is often used this way by philosophers but I suspect that only philosophers 
use "God" this way and that they only do so acting in that capacity. I have no 
objection to those who take words in common usage and employ them in different 
ways for specialized uses provided this serves some purpose. I am not sure what 
purpose is served by discussing the existence of the god of the philosophers. 
The concern of most common people, and I include myself in that category, is 
rather with the existence of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. If I am 
correct "God" is used referentially and not attributively outside of specialized 
philosophical contexts in this culture. 
III 
It is a commonplace that Judaism, Christianity and Islam are the three great 
historical religions. They are also the most important in world culture at present 
both in terms of numbers of adherents and of vitality. But by saying that they 
are the historical religions we do not say that they are the most important historical 
religious forces, we say that the religions are themselves historical. Traditional 
Judaism, Christianity and Islam describe God interacting with human com-
munities and revealing Himself to them from time to time. He reveals His name 
to humans but He cannot communicate His nature to them as this is beyond 
human comprehension. "God," "Yahweh," "Allah," are names of a Being 
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encountered by certain actual historical individuals; Moses, Abraham, Paul, 
Mohammed. "God," and similar names are used referentially to pick out the 
God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and not attributively to pick out whatever or 
whoever is omnipotent, etc. 
To grasp this point is to see that the objection that CTR with its naturalistic 
motivations is inevitably biased against religion in favor of critique is incorrect. 
CTR is the implicit theory of both critique and of the historical religions which 
it attacks. This also tends to explain why non-philosophers are inclined to see 
more relevance in critique than in, for example, the ontological argument. Unlike 
philosophers blinded by a descriptive theory of reference they see the historical 
validity of religion as essential rather than incidental. 
CTR shows critique to be a philosophically sophisticated challenge to the 
self-understanding of the historical religions. It attacks these religions on their 
own ground. It denies the truth of what they have always considered essential. 
Beginning with textual criticism, applying serious objective standards to the 
Bible as a literary-historical document, the extent of the 'mythical and poetic 
nature of the text was revealed. The human authors, understandably enough, did 
not write history in the modem style with respect for modem standards of 
accuracy. Their purposes were simply different from those of modem historians. 
The validity of much of the textual criticism is apparent to all but the most 
doctrinaire conservatives. Radical critique simply took this one step further in 
speculating that the story of God's interaction with man is entirely a creature of 
fantasy. 
There is a tendency on the part of those who still identify with one of these 
religious traditions to accept critique in whole or in part. Indeed to reject it as 
completely false, to say that neurotic impulses and/or wishful thinking have 
absolutely no part in anyone's religious beliefs is a rather desperate response. I 
hope that in the previous section I have shown how the extreme liberal reaction 
to accept critique completely and so interpret all the miraculous and revelatory 
parts of the history as having naturalistic causes and still accept the tradition is 
problematic. The consequence of such a view, whether intended or not, is that 
God does not exist. 
These considerations have forced me, and I hope will force others, to face 
the question: Is there a version of critique which is at once plausible and powerful 
enough to refute the reference claims of the historical religions? I would answer 
that at present there is not. The suggestion which I made earlier that critique 
describes the history of religious language, in the Judeo-Christian tradition at 
least, as originating in a block is complicated by the fact that "God" is multiply 
grounded in direct references. The Judeo-Christian understanding of history is 
that God has repeatedly encountered man, in the prophets of the Old Testament 
and beyond. Others would add that God directly encounters many anonymous 
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men and women in their daily lives in the present as well as in the past. This 
complicates matters for critique. If the causal chain leading back from present 
uses converged on just one or at most a few cases, as in the case of the scholar 
mistakenly concluding that a heap of fragments from diverse sources all had a 
common author whom he proceeds to call Homer, it would be far easier to show 
that the history ended in a block. If the reference claim rests exclusively on the 
story of Moses then the debunking of that tale would be sufficient to refute it. 
A version of critique which would be strong enough to deny the reference of 
"God" would have to be very strong indeed. It would have to show that all the 
ostensible direct references to "God" were radically defective. Existing versions 
of critique have a power and plausibility that should not be underrated. Clearly, 
projection, delusion and plain wishful thinking are elements of the religious life 
of many. Significantly, there have been numerous instances of bizarre and 
pathological behavior among those who have claimed direct contact with the 
Deity. It would be foolish to deny critique its element of truth but the prospects 
for a complete debunking of religion along these lines are dim. 
Any economic or sociological critique which traces religious experience back 
to specific historical conditions in a society at a particular point in its development, 
as in Marx and Nietzsche, will fail to account for all direct reference claims. 
No such theory that I could forsee would be adequate to explain Ezekiel, Paul, 
and Francis of Assisi in terms of common cultural forces acting on all three. 
Freud's critique is the most serious challenge. Read with sympathy it is more 
psychological than historical. 14 His theories would trace the origins of religious 
experience and belief to very basic human experiences; feelings of warmth, 
closeness and oneness with a human mother and/or feelings of guilt, love, 
aggression and fear of a human father. A psychological theory of this type might 
be in a better position to explain how religious experience could arise in a wide 
variety of cultures as long as humans are born of woman and have mixed feelings 
about their fathers. A Freudian theory could more easily explain the (nearly?) 
universal existence of religion in human culture. 
While in the long run Freudianism of all the versions of critique offers the 
stiffest challenge, at present it falls far short of blocking the reference claims of 
religion. The problem is that while some very common and basic experiences 
can be noted as likely causes of religious experience and belief these are plainly 
not sufficient causal conditions and we do not even know what sufficient 
psychological causes of religious beliefs would be like. Obviously not all humans 
with these common experiences tum out the same. Religious experience is 
unlikely to have uniform psychic causes because religious experience is itself 
extremely diverse. The religious man is not a simple character type like "the 
miser," or "the magnanimous man" who could in principle be explained in a 
unilinear way. At times through loss of perspective it may appear as if all those 
THE REFERENCE OF "GOD" 13 
who claim direct experience of God are cut from the same cloth; if, for example, 
one were to focus exclusively on a small religious community for a short period 
of time like mid-17th Century Puritans in Massachusetts. But a glance at such 
works as William James' Varieties of Religious Experience quickly puts this 
delusion to rest. I am no more sanguine that we will find factors common to the 
personalities of Ezekiel, Paul and Francis of Assisi than that we should discover 
common factors in their economies. 
Let me make my final position on this issue plain. In principle critique could 
refute reference claims for "God." In practice it falls far short of doing so chiefly 
due to the unacknowledged variety of persons claiming to ground such reference 
claims. Successful critique would have to recognize the diversity of religious 
experience and provide separate and sufficient naturalistic explanations of the 
most important types. This is a bigger job than Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche, or 
Freud attempted. But critique fails not because it can be philosophically proven 
to be metaphysically irrelevant. Its weaknesses are factual and theoretical and 
could be remedied by some broader, more sophisticated future critique. 
IV 
I would like to conclude this paper by briefly mentioning what I consider a 
more positive contribution of CTR to the philosophy of religion. While CTR 
increases the seriousness of critique's challenge it diminishes another. One of 
the greatest difficulties facing the rational defender of religious belief is the 
embarrassing mUltiplicity of faiths. No matter how cogently one justifies one's 
belief the objection threatens that there are, after all, so many different religions 
and only one at most could possibly be true. 
The accusation goes back at least as far as Epicurus and was used with masterful 
grace by Hume in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. The mUltiplicity 
of religious belief is used as an argument against all. If the reasons used to 
support one religion can be used, mutatis mutandis, to support contradictory 
religious traditions just as well then such reasons cannot be used to rationally 
support any. Reasons, whether moral experience, religious experience, miracles, 
the order of the natural world or revelation, which support both Zeus and Yahweh 
support neither. Skillfully used this argument can make any option other than 
atheism seem ethnocentric at best and bigoted at worst. My feeling is that such 
an argument, regardless of how much we suspect its cogency, is very persuasive. 
One response to the embarrassment is to limit the claims of natural theology 
to the defense of a minimal set of beliefs compatible with all major religions. 
The tactic is to avoid such divide-and-conquer gambits by finding a defensible 
lowest common denominator of man's religious belief. The reason I have trouble 
accepting a lowest common denominator is that I can see none that would strike 
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most people as both true and meaningful. It is at this point that CTR comes to 
our aid. CTR allows us to dispose of the embarrassment of a God of the Hebrews, 
God of the Arabs, God of the Hindus etc. These could all be different names 
for the same Being even if there is no significant overlap in belief about His nature. 
Despite wide and deep differences of belief about the nature of "Yahweh," 
"Allah," "Brahma," or even such impersonally conceived entities as "Tao," and 
"Nirvana," they may all be different names for a Being, variously and dimly 
understood by different cultures, who has interacted with human communities 
throughout history. I do not find it implausible that there have been genuine 
Divine-human encounters with diverse human cultures. If that is in fact true then 
we could agree that all men address the same God no matter how differently 
they conceive Him. Nor do we have to as a consequence minimize or ignore 
the importance of the differences. They remain significant and imminently dis-
cussible even if they do not determine reference. Many can find unity in a 
common object of worship within diversity of conception and practice. 
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NOTES 
1. Bertrand Russell and F. C. Copleston, "The Existence of God." in Philosophy of Religion, ed. 
John Hick (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 282-301. 
2. Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979). 
3. John Wisdom, "Gods," Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society, (1944-5). 
4. It no longer seems odd to find Wittgensteineans and Heideggereans not only talking about the 
same issue but saying essentially the same thing since the publication of Richard Rorty's Philosophy 
and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981). 
5. Readers who are unfamiliar with the causal theory of reference would profit from Stephan 
Swartz' introduction to Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1977) upon which my brief descriptions in this paper are largely based. 
6. Kripke's criticism of Donnellan occurs in "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference," Mid-
west Studies in Philosophy II, (1977). Donnellan's position is found in "Reference and Definite 
Description," and "Speaking of Nothing" both in Swartz, op. cit. and in 'The Contingent A Priori 
and Rigid Designators," Midwest Studies in Philosophy II, (1977). He answers Kripke's objections 
in "Speaker's References, Description and Anaphora," in Syntax and Semantics, ed. Cole (New 
York: Academic Press, 1978). 
7. Colin McGinn not only develops a competing theory in "The Mechanism of Reference," Synthese, 
49, 1981, but also summarizes the major criticisms of CTR adding some of his own. 
8. All these examples are from "Reference and Definite Descriptions." 
9. "Speaking of Nothing," p. 237. 
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10. "Speaking of Nothing," p. 239. Donnellan adds minor qualifications omitted here. 
11. All these figures are discussed at length in Hans Kiing's Does God Exist?, trans. Edward Quinn 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1981). 
12. Kung, pp. 301-2. 
13. lam endebted to the editor for bringing this objection, which I now see as obvious, to my attention. 
14. My understanding of Freud has been sharpened by W. P. Alston's "Psychoanalytic Theory and 
Theistic Belief," in Faith and the Philosophers, ed. 10hnHick, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964). 
